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ACOMPARATIVE study of labor developments in the United
States and in some of the civil law countries strikingly illus-
trates the degree to which the collective bargaining agreement
remains an unassimilated phenomenon in the structure of American
law.' This does not mean that American legislators, judges and scholars
have not considered the problem at length,2 for they recognize the tre-
mendous importance of the collective bargaining agreement as an almost
singular instance of private "legislation," so to speak, controlling some of
the most important relationships in our society. But it does suggest that
whatever legal efforts we have expended have been directed primarily
at the making of collective agreements. Thus, the Norris-LaGuardia Act
greatly broadened the base of collective bargaining by unleashing the
economic strength of organized labor; and the Wagner Act resulted
in tremendous developments-far beyond the liking of a later Congress,
as the Taft-Hartley Act has shown. But while both these statutes exhibit
great concern for the making of collective agreements, precious little has
been done in our law to insure their enforcibility.
This state of imbalance may perhaps be explained by the fact that a
laissez-faire minded legal system preferred to leave the enforcement of
this novel "contract" to the parties themselves. Moreover, there never has
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' See Schmidt and Heineman, Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreements in
Swedish Law, i4 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 184 (1947); and cf. Weisberg, The Transformation of the
Collective Agreement in Soviet Law, 16 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 444 (1949).
2 See Lenhoff, The Present Status of Collective Contracts in the American Legal System,
39 MAich. L. Rev. i xog (1941); Rice, Collective Labor Agreements in American Law, 44 Harv.
L. Rev. 572 (193r); Fuchs, Collective Labor Agreements in American Law, ro St. Louis L.
Rev. , (1924).
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been as much political pressure on our courts and legislatures to provide
for the enforcement of collective agreements as there has been toward
the making and the acceptance of them in the first instance. To be sure,
many of our courts have developed techniques of enforcing labor agree-
ments during the last fifteen or twenty years. While this experience has
shown that the enforcement of certain provisions may be accomplished
through the use of judicial process (i.e., damage suits against unions for
breach of contract and other issues connected with breaches of no-strike
clauses, as well as suits by unions to enforce compliance with union
security provisions), it has also indicated that employers and unions are
not willing to put up with the expense and to take the time that litigation
requires in settling more routine disputes. Hence, while certain aspects
of enforcement are left to the courts, the handling of grievances arising
under collective agreements has largely been taken over by private arbi-
tration, in accordance with provisions to that effect in the agreements.
Furthermore, employers and unions have tended to submit to arbitration
many of their disputes not arising under formal contracts. Just as the
medieval merchants found it expedient to set up their own tribunals or
pie powder courts' in the great markets of early England, so employers
and the unions representing their employees have more and more come to
utilize arbitration as a private, informal and extra-judicial method of
settling their differences. The parties to the great majority of collective
agreements4 will nowadays include provisions committing themselves to
arbitrate such differences as may thereafter arise between them concern-
ing the interpretation and application of such agreements. These com-
mitments in advance to arbitrate future differences reveal a civilized
trend. Unfortunately, however, in keeping with a traditional attitude,
the courts will not enforce provisions to arbitrate, even where they are
now willing to enforce the more conventional terms of collective agree-
ments as a whole.5 This refusal would be illustrative of little more than
3 So called because justice was administered as speedily as the dust falls from the foot-
hence, pied poudre. For a discussion of these early courts see Wolaver, Historical Background
of Arbitration, 83 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 132, 136 et seq. (1934).
4 It is estimated that three out of four collective bargaining agreements negotiated today
provide for arbitration as the terminal point of disputes arising under the contract. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, 59 Monthly Lab. Rev. iooi (i944); see Studies in Personnel Policy, No. 71,
at iz (Nat'l Ind. Conf. Board, 1946).
5 This is the majority rule. See for example, Leveranz v. Cleveland Home Brewing Co.,
24 N.P.(N.S.) 193 (Ohio, 1922), enforcinga collective bargaining agreement, and Utility Work-
ers Union v. Ohio Power Co., 36 Oh. Ops. 324, 77 N.E. 2d 629 (1947), refusing to enforce an
arbitration clause appearing in a collective agreement. While collective agreements are now en-
forced almost everywhere, in no more than ten states will the arbitration clause appearing
therein be enforced. See p. 241 infra.
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the normal judicial lag were it not for the rapid modern developments of
labor-management arbitration. As it is, the gap is an alarmingly wide one.
Happily, most employers and unions regard the arbitration agreement
as an "article of faith." In the overwhelming number of instances, the
parties have honored their agreements to arbitrate. It is seldom that a
court is called upon to enforce a labor arbitration award; and only
slightly more often have the courts been asked to enforce undertakings
to arbitrate in collective labor agreements. Thus, the number of con-
tracts honored greatly exceeds the number broken. But it cannot be
reasonably expected that contractual commitments which may be
broken with impunity will very long continue to be rigorously observed.
And in view of the greatly increased use of arbitration, largely due to the
impetus furnished by wartime measures encouraging the peaceful settle-
ment of industrial disputes,0 the extent to which these promises will be
broken is bound to increase. Such breaches of good faith are likely to
imperil the whole arbitral process. As more and more awards and agree-
ments to arbitrate are ignored with impunity, the more arbitration will
become just another way-station to, rather than a rescue-station from,
industrial conflict. In an area where the peaceful resolution of disputes
is so important, this trend could have tragic results. A re-examination of
the legal nature of the labor-management agreement to arbitrate there-
fore seems imperative.
I. THE COMMON LAW
The common-law doctrine that agreements to arbitrate are revocable
at the will of either party has been attributed to an early judicial antip-
athy to tribunals "competing" with the courts themselves. Lord Coke,
while compelling the forfeiture of a penal bond that had been put up to
guarantee the performance of an agreement to arbitrate-such per-
formance having been neglected-off-handedly remarked that such
agreements were revocable because "my act or my words cannot alter my
judgment of the law to make that irrevocable which is of its own nature
revocable." 7 Because of Coke's great prestige, this notion quickly be-
6In 1942 the National Labor Relations Board was vested with the authority to decide labor
disputes, Exec. Order, 7 Fed. Reg. 237 (r942), following the "no-strike, no-lockout" edict of
December, I941. The Board was to assume jurisdiction and finally to determine the dispute
through "mediation, voluntary arbitration, or arbitration under rules provided by the Board."
For an account of the Board's wartime arbitration activities see Freidin and Ulman, Arbitra-
tion and the National War Labor Board, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 309 (1945).
7 Vynior's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 302, 305 (K.B., I6o9). There is a dispute as to Coke's accuracy
in summing up the commonlaw. Coke was right: Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitra-
tion Law, 37 Yale LJ. 595 (1928). Coke was wrong: Cohen, Commercial Arbitration and the
Law 84-93 (i9'8).
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came established and has flourished over three hundred and fifty years.
No one has ever adequately explained just what there is in the "nature"
of an agreement to arbitrate that makes it inherently revocable. Any
attempted explanation is rendered even more difficult by the fact that
courts will, generally, enforce the award when an arbitration has been
completed,8 and, where it has not, will make a noncomplying party pay
over any agreed forfeiture for not having lived up to his agreement.'
Further, an action at law for breach of an agreement will be entertained
and nominal damages awarded.' ° Thus, for the payment of a nominal
sum one need not respect his otherwise valid obligation !1
Ever since the middle of the nineteenth century, lawyers have been
puzzled over the unenforcibility of agreements to arbitrate. Lord Camp-
bell advanced the theory that the revocability doctrine "had its origin in
the interests of the judges."- 2 It seems that the income received by seven-
teenth- and eighteenth-century English judges consisted mainly of fees
received from the cases they heard. Perhaps for that reason judges
naturally looked upon arbitrations as devices which "ousted their juris-
diction."'" Thirty-five years ago Judge Hough observed: "No reason for
the simple statement that arbitration agreements are against public
policy has ever been advanced, except that it must be against such policy
to oust the courts of jurisdiction."' 4 Yet waivers, covenants not to sue,
and consent decrees-all "ousters" of a sort-have been given judicial
blessing. "It is," as Judge Hough remarked, " "surely a singular view
of juridical sanctity which reasons that, because the Legislature has made
a court, therefore everybody must go to the court."
Nevertheless, the more judges criticized the doctrine of revocability,
9 Rueda v. Union Pac. R. Co., x8o Ore. 133, 175 P. 2d 778 (1946). See 6 Williston § i927 n. 2
(rev. ed. 1938) for a collection of cases. The reason has been given that an award at common law
will be enforced because it is the agreement of the parties. Jenifer v. Comm'rs, I3 D. Repr. i89,
2 Disney 189 (Cinn. Superior Court Rep., 1858). Why the award represents an agreement
while the submission itself does not is extremely difficult to explain.
9 Sturges, Commercial Arbitrations and Awards § 298 (1930).
See Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 Yale L.J. S95, at 6o6 (i928).
It is readily apparent that Holmes' "right to break a contract" is a flourishing notion in
the law of arbitration. The Restatement adopts this view. Rest., Contracts § 550 (1932).
12 Scott v. Avery, 25 L.J. Ex. 308, 313 (x856).
13 This rationale reputedly originated in Kill v. Hollister, i Wilson 129 (K.B., 1746). For a
discussion of this doctrine and associated cases see Wolaver, The Historical Background of
Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 132, 138 et seq. (1934).
14 United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 Fed. ioo6, ioo8
(D.C.N.Y., 1915).
is Ibid., at ioop.
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the more inflexibly they observed it-Judge Hough included. Judge
Frank, with his usual penetrating wit, had this to say: "Perhaps the
true explanation is the hypnotic power of the phrase, 'oust the jurisdic-
tion.' Give a bad dogma a good name and its bite may become as bad as
its bark." 6
But the strict common-law rule has undergone some change. Lord
Campbell qualified it with the doctrine that if arbitration were to be used
merely to determine preliminary issues upon which liability could be
based, and not as an ultimate disposition of the issue on the merits, then
the agreement would be enforced.' 7 Moreover, wherever they have found
it possible to do so, courts have distinguished between an arbitration and
an "appraisement'-that is, the determination of some fact upon which
the issues of liability could be formulated, as for example the amount of
damages suffered, in contradistinction to the issue of liability itself "as
a matter of law."" The common-law history of commercial arbitration
has been treated adequately and in detail elsewhere,' " and the great body
of case law on the subject of commercial arbitration has been classified
and digested in several authoritative tomes.20 A rehash here would serve
no purpose. But since, by and large, the rules formed to govern commer-
cial arbitration constitute the major source of the common law which is
today applied to labor arbitrations, the following concise summary of
the principles of common-law arbitration, formulated by the Depart-
ment of Labor, will prove useful.2'
Common law arbitration rests upon a voluntary agreement of the parties to sub-
mit their dispute to an outsider. The submission agreement may be oral and may be
revoked at any time before the rendering of the award. The tribunal, permanent or
temporary, may be composed of any number of arbitrators. They must be free from
bias and interest in the subject matter, and may not be related by affinity or consan-
guinity to either party. The arbitrators need not be sworn. Only existing disputes may
be submitted to them. The parties must be given notice of hearings and are entitled
6Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F. 2d 978, 984 (C.C.A. 2d, I942).
17 Scott v. Avery, 25 L.J. Ex. 3o8 (1856). A great many of the "whittling precedents" are
cited in Matter of Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, 23o N.Y. 26r, 13o N.E. 288 (1921).
18 6 Williston, Contracts § I92rA (rev. ed. z938).
9 Wolaver, The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. of Pa. L. Rev
132 (1934); Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 Yale L.J. 595 (1928).
There are some excellent judicial essays on the subject: see Judge Frank, Kulukundis Shipping
Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F. 2d 978 (C.C.A. 2d, 1942); and Judge Peterson's dissent
in Park Construction Co. v. Independent School District, 209 Minn. 182, 296 N.W. 475 (r941).
20 Sturges, Commercial Arbitrations and Awards (1930); 6 Williston Contracts § i98 et
seq. (rev. ed. 1938).
21 Labor Arbitration under State Statutes (U.S. Dep't of Labor, 1943).
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to be present when all the evidence is received. The arbitrators have no power to sub-
poena witnesses or records and need not conform to legal rules of hearing procedure
other than to give the parties an opportunity to present all competent evidence. All
arbitrators must attend the hearings, consider the evidence jointly and arrive at an
award by a unanimous vote.The award may be oral, but if written, all the arbitrators
must sign it. It must dispose of every substantial issue submitted to arbitration. An
award may be set aside only for fraud, misconduct, gross mistake, or substantial breach
of a common law rule. The only method of enforcing the common law award is to file
suit upon it and the judgment thus obtained may be enforced as any other judgment.
This, then, is the judicial climate in which employers and unions have
attempted to foster agreements to arbitrate their differences and dis-
putes. The considerable statutory development in the field indicates the
intolerable state of the judge-made common law which was intended to
throttle a technique that society found useful. But an examination re-
veals that even the almost numberless arbitration statutes failed to pro-
vide adequately for the enforcement of labor-management agreements
to arbitrate.
II. THE STATUTES
It is apparent that common-law arbitration is of little utility in the
context of modern labor relations. First of all, if the agreement to arbi-
trate is revocable, it can be depended upon by nobody. Second, when an
arbitral board, instead of a single arbitrator, is used in labor cases, it
usually includes "interested" or partisan representatives of each side.
Third, the present agreement to arbitrate disputes arising in the future,
and not merely presently existing disputes-the most important item in
collective labor agreement arbitration procedures-is not enforcible at
common law. And finally, the whole point of arbitration is lost if the
winning party has to go to court to enforce the award and the judge
requires the virtual relitigation of all the issues involved. Indeed, these
same criticisms generally hold true when common-law arbitration is used
in the commercial world in settling issues between business men. The
commercial world had long felt these inadequacies and consequently the
commercial arbitration statute is of ancient vintage.22 But it was not
until the late i88o's that legislative interest was first displayed in labor
arbitration. Then it was recognized that employers and employees as
well as business men required a procedure whereby disputes could be
settled without the delay, technical irritation and expense of an inexpert
- For a brief history of these statutes see Simpson, Specific Enforcement of Arbitration
Contracts, 83 U. of Pa. L. Rev. x6o, 164 et seq. (1934).
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jury trial. Many of our states responded to this need with statutes pro-
viding for the enforcement of arbitration agreements.2
The early statutes made no distinctions between commercial and in-
dustrial-or labor-arbitration. They were designed primarily to over-
come the common-law disabilities in the enforcement of commercial
arbitration agreements, since it was then too early to spend much thought
on arbitration in the labor field. Arbitration in that field assumed impor-
tance only after collective bargaining became fairly extensive and began
to reach an advanced stage of development. Certainly in the late nine-
teenth century neither economic conditions nor social ideology required
that labor disputes be arbitrated. These statutes, however, did not satisfy
even the needs of the merchants. Without exception the early statutes
were confined to the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate only already
existing disputes-the so-called "submission agreement." Aside from the
possible constitutional objections to enforcing agreements to arbitrate
disputes arising in the future,2 4 legislatures generally believed that it was
safer to enforce only submission agreements pertaining to existing
disputes.
The policy argument against enforcing "future-disputes" clauses was
a variant of the "ouster of jurisdiction" rationale. The theory was ad-
vanced that if the courts were not free to intervene, they would be foster-
ing a method which the unscrupulous might abuse-a process under
which, "by first making the contract, and then declaring who should con-
strue it, the strong could oppress the weak."2 5 But it is difficult to imagine
why a future-disputes arbitration provision in a contract should expose
23 The origins of labor arbitra tion in America are traced in Oliver, The Arbitration of Labor
Disputes, 83 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 2o6, 213 et seq. (i934). SeealsoLapp, Labor Arbitration 5 (z94 2).
24 See Cocalis v. Nazlides, 308 Ill. 152, 139 N.E. 95 (x923), which declares that future-dis-
putes clauses are void at common law in Illinois and suggests that they are prejudicial to the
rights of citizens, as guaranteed by the Constitution, to resort to the courts for the determina-
tion of their rights.
25 Parsons v. Ambos, 121 Ga. 98, 48 S.E. 696, 697 (i9o4); cf. Cocalis v. Nazlides, 308 Ill.
152, 139 N.E. 95 (1923); Blodgett v. Bebe Co., 19o Cal. 665, 214 Pac. 38 (1923). In the con-
gressional hearings on the advisability of a federal arbitration statute this reason was as-
signed as "the real fundamental cause" of the courts' refusal to enforce arbitration agreements.
Hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 69th Cong. ist Sess., at i5 (1924). The report
of the Standing Committee on Commerce, 53 A.B.A. Rep. 337, 352 (928), concluded that
the fear that the stronger party in a labor dispute would have the power to compel the other
to submit to a controlled arbitration was at the bottom of opposition to the application of the
principle of arbitration in the field of industrial disputes. Later developments, such as the
popularity of labor-management arbitration agreements and the frequency with which labor
now seeks the aid of the courts in enforcing arbitration agreements, would indicate that this
fear had been dispelled.
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one of the parties to greater dangers than are inherent in any other con-
sensual relationship. Indeed, the opportunities for oppression and abuse
appear to be much greater where one party, suddenly discovering it is to
his benefit not to arbitrate at all, is allowed to frustrate the agreement
and ,set at naught the reliance of the other party by escaping his own
deliberately assumed obligation.
Nevertheless, it is still the rule in most states that only an agreement
to submit an existing dispute will be specifically enforced. Two states,
Alabama and South Dakota, expressly declare that any kind of agree-
ment to arbitrate may not be specifically enforced.26 One state expressly
refuses to permit an arbitration agreement of any kind to be pleaded as a
bar to a suit on the subject matter of the dispute; 2 7 in two states the rele-
vant statutes have been construed not to change the rule that any kind of
agreement to arbitrate is unenforcible; 23 and one statute declares that
any agreement to arbitrate may be revoked at any time prior to the pub-
lication of the award. 9 Two states are silent on the subject.3 In South
Carolina the resolution of the question still remains in some doubt,3
since there the requirements may, but more likely do not, provide a basis
for enforcement. The remainder of the states will enforce an arbitration
agreement of some sort, the major division among them being between
the enforcement of submission agreements and of future-disputes
clauses. Twenty-two states will enforce a submission agreement only,3 2
nine of them requiring that the submission agreement first be made a
"rule of court. 3 3
The tendency of the states to enforce only submission agreements is
26 Ala. Code Ann. (Michie, West, Harrison, 194o) tit. 9, § 55; S.D. Code (939) § 37.4602.
27 Mo. Rev. Stat. (x939) § 15233.
29 Nebraska: Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Zlotky, 66 Neb. 584,92 N.W. 736 (19o2); Butler v. Greene,
49 Neb. 280, 68 N.W. 496 (1896). Mississippi: Jones v. Harris, 59 Mvfiss. 214 (1881).
29 N.D. Rev. Code (1943) § 32-2920. 30 Oklahoma and Vermont.
31 S.C. Code of Laws (1942) § 7041 (parties must post a bond of double the amount in ques-
tion to insure obedience to the award).
32 Ark. Civ. Code Ann. (Crawford, 1934) § 494; Fla. Stats. Comp. (1941) c. 57; Ga. Code
Ann. (1935) C. 7-2; Idaho Code Ann. (1947) § 7-903; Ill. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. io, § r; Ind.
Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 3-201; Iowa Code (1946) § 679.6; Kan. Gen. Stat. (Corrick, 1935)
c. 6-ioi; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Baldwin, 1948) § 417.o0o; Me. Rev. Stat. (1944) c. lO8, p. 1790;
Md. Ann. Code (Flack, 1939) art. 7, § 4; Minn. Stat. (Mason, i945) § 572.01; Mont. Rev. Code
Ann. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) § 9974; Nev. Comp. Laws (Hlyer, 1929) § 510; N.M.
Stat. Ann. (1941) C. 25-301-25-307; N.C. Gen. Stat. (Michie, 1943) § 1-544; Tenn. Code
Ann. (Michie, 1938) §§ 9359-9382; Tex. Ann. Rev. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1925) arts. 224-226;
Utah Rev. Stat. Ann. (1933) § xo4-36-i; Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942) § 616o; W.Va. Code
Ann. (Michie, 1943)§§ 5499-00; Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Bobbs-Merrill, 1945) § 3-56oi.
33 Ark., Idaho, Ind., Kan., Me., Mont., Tenn., Va., and W.Va.
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thought to be due in some measure to the policy of the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. The Commissioners promulgated a Uniform Arbi-
tration Act"4 directed at all types of arbitration, but confined it to the
enforcement of submission agreements. This act was not well received,
having been adopted in only four states,3 5 and the Commissioners have
since relegated it to the "inactive list."3 6 Future-disputes clauses first
came into their own in the so-called Draft State Arbitration Act promul-
gated by the American Arbitration Association. This proposed act did
not explicitly mention labor disputes and seems to have been designed
for commercial arbitration. New York, in 1920, was the first to adopt it
in substance,"7 and thus became the first state to provide that an agree-
ment to arbitrate disputes that might arise in the future is both valid and
irrevocable. Sixteen states38 and the federal government" have, to date,
enacted arbitration statutes patterned after the Draft State Act. Seven
of these states40 and Congress,4 - however, have excluded labor-manage-
ment contracts from the operation of their statutes. When to this group
of Draft State Acts is added the Delaware statute, enacted in 1947 and
unique in that it covers only collective labor agreements and makes
future-disputes clauses valid and enforcible,4 2 there is a total of ten
states in which future-disputes clauses appearing in collective bargaining
agreements will be enforced." In the remainder of the states, and in the
34 9 Uniform Laws Annotated 61 (1942).
3s Nev. Comp. Laws (Hilyer, 1929) §§ 510-534; N.C. Gen. Stat. (Michie, z943) § r-544 et
seq.; Utah Rev. Stat. Ann. (1933) § io4-36-i et seq.; Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Bobbs-Merrill
X945) § 3-56oi.
36 See Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 73
(i943).
37 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act (Thompson, part 11, 1939) §§ i448-69.
38 The following states to date have enacted "Draft State" acts. Ariz. Code Ann. (1931) §
27-3o9; Cal. Code Civ. Prac. (Hillyer-Lake, 1947) part 3, tit. X, § 128o; Colo. Stat. Ann.
(Michie, 1935) Rules of Civil Procedure 10--io; Conn. Gen. Stat. (i93 o ) § 584o; La. Gen. Stat.
Ann. (Dart, 1939) § 405; Mass. Ann. Laws (1933) C. 251, § 14; Mich. Stat. Ann. (Henrosa,
r943) § 27.2483; N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 415 (Amendment, N.H.L. [1945] c. 1gi, excludes
labor contracts unless the arbitration agreement specifies it is subject to the provisions of this
chapter); N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) tit. 2, c. 40, § io; N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act (Thompson, part 11,
1939) §§ r448-69; Ohio Code Ann. (Throckmorton, 1949) §§ 12148-I-12r48-i7; Ore. Comp.
Laws Ann. (294o) §§ ii-6o, 6o2; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 5, § 16l; R.I. Gen. Laws
(1938) C. 475, § r; Wash. L. (1947) C. 209; Wis. Stat. (Brossard, 1947) § 298.01.
39 43 Stat. 883-886 (1925), 9 U.S.C.A. §§ r-i5 (1942).
4o Ariz., lich., N.H., Ohio, Ore., R.I., and Wis.
4143 Stat. 883 (X925), 9 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1942).
4Del. L. (1947) c. 196, § 7.
4 3Cal., Colo., Conn., Del., La., Mass., N.J., N.Y., Pa., and Wash.
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federal courts (with some minor variances) 44 future-disputes clauses
may be disregarded with impunity.
Although these ten states are in a minority, their influence is consider-
able, especially when it is remembered that they include several of the
leading industrial states. Indeed, if it were not for such industrial giants
as Ohio, Illinois and Michigan, which still cling to the rule of revo-
cability, it might appear that wherever the need for enforcing the agree-
ment has been felt, the old common-law principles have generally given
way.
But even where the common-law principles have given way, it cannot
be said that the need has been fully met. Even those states which have
enacted the Draft State Acts which include labor agreements in their
provisions have not so phrased their statutes as to embrace the whole
gamut of labor disputes. They provide for the enforcement only of
agreements to arbitrate the type of dispute that may be the subject of an
action at law or equity in a civil proceeding. In thus confining the arbitral
area to justiciable disputes of this type, these states have failed to give
official sanction to a large and important area of industrial arbitration.
The pros and cons of this position will be examined shortly.
With the exception of the Delaware act, the statutes so far dealt with
have been "general," that is, have been directed at arbitration in gen-
eral. Employer-employee contracts were expressly excluded in some of
those which enforced future-disputes clauses; but these exclusions were
more or less afterthoughts and did not otherwise affect the procedural
and substantive aspects of the statutes involved. Besides these statutes
just discussed, there have been enacted a number of special labor arbitra-
tion statutes. This special legislation has been aimed less at the disposi-
tion of disputes arising from already bargained collective agreements
than at providing a procedure for the settling of bargaining disputes over
the terms of contracts yet to be made. Among these are the so-called
compulsory arbitration statutes. They usually provide that some govern-
ment official, often the governor, either upon a report made to him by a
state investigating board or upon the application of one of the disputants,
can order the parties to arbitrate and can prevent them from taking
recourse to self-help until the arbitration is completed.4 5 These statutes
are all confined to the sphere of public utilities or public service enter-
44 Note the discussion of the Federal Arbitration Act p. 259 infra.
4s Eleven states have this type of statute. Fla., Ind., Mich., Minn., Mo., Neb., N.J., Pa.,
Tex., Va., and Wis. For a discussion of these statutes see Bernstein, Recent Legislative De-
velopments, i Indust. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 406 (1948).
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prises such as hospitals. In recent years quite a few statutes of this type
have sprung up.4 6 But since they are confined to a very limited class of
relationships, their influence in shaping the broader aspects of industrial
or labor arbitration has been negligible. Moreover, they have not been
received favorably in the courts, several of these acts having been de-
clared unconstitutional either because they were thought to be violations
of basic rights,4 ' or for more technical reasons.48 Compulsory arbitration
of any type has never been politically popular in this country; and its
use can probably be justified only in the public interest for the settlement
of otherwise insoluble problems.
In the sphere of voluntary arbitration agreements it is highly doubt-
ful whether any of the special labor statutes make either an existing or a
future-disputes agreement enforcible where it had not been so before.
The major purpose of these special labor statutes is to promote arbitra-
tion rather than to enforce it. They set up permanent and temporary
tribunals to hear grievances and disputes; conciliation and mediation
facilities are established; boards and agencies are created to investigate
and perhaps to arbitrate if called upon.4 9 Several states have permanent
state boards of arbitration.5 0 The majority provide ad hoc tribunals for
voluntary arbitration of labor disputes.5 ' In seven states the govern-
mental bureau which is in charge of labor may act as the arbitration
agency.5 2 It is apparent that in the main these statutes simply provide
the machinery for voluntary adjustment of labor disputes, leaving the
46 Many of these statutes were passed in X947. The development of compulsory settlement
of labor disputes in this country is considered in detail in Williams, The Compulsory Settle-
ment of Contract Negotiation Labor Disputes, 27 Tex. L. Rev. 587 (1949).
47 Compare Wolff Packing Co. v. Kansas Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (19 23);
State ex rel. Dairyland Power Cooperative v. WERE, 14 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 64385 (Wis.
C.C., 1948), vacated on other grounds and remanded 15 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 64638 (Wis.
S. Ct., 1948). The case was dismissed in the lower court on the remand since the labor dispute
had been settled. i5 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. IT 64715 (Wis. C.C., 1948).
48 The flaw in the Michigan statute was in vesting in the presiding judge of the circuit
in which the dispute arose the power to appoint a circuit judge as chairman of the board of ar-
bitration. This was held to violate the Michigan constitution as an attempt to confer non-
judicial duties upon a judicial officer. Local 17o, Transport Workers Union of America, CIO v.
Gadola, 322 Mich. 332, 34 N.W. 2d 71 (1948).
49 These statutes, among others, are compiled and elaborately catalogued in a study pre-
pared under the direction of David Ziskind for the Office of the Solicitor, Department of Labor.
Labor Arbitration under State Statutes (U.S. Dep't of Labor, 1943). The important arbitra-
tion statutes that have been enacted subsequent to this study have been included in various
sections of this article.
so Ibid., Analytical Table of State Labor Arbitration Statutes 26: Colo., Conn., Maine,
Md., Mass., Mont., N.H., and Okla.
5 Ibid. s2 Ibid. Cal., Ill., Kan., Ohio, S.C., Vt., and Wis.
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parties free to use or not to use the machinery as they see fit. Some states
go a little further and empower an agency to inquire into the causes un-
derlying the dispute and to publish a report, or, in addition, to state who
is at fault.5 3 Here the attempt is to secure industrial peace by public
pressure. This method has obvious shortcomings. The archaic and cha-
otic condition of the state statutes on the subject is indicated by the re-
quirement in some of them that in order to be arbitrated, disputes must
not involve questions which may be the subject of a civil action. 4 These
were enacted at an early date when it was feared that arbitration statutes
might be declared unconstitutional if they appeared to divest the courts
of jurisdiction. They present an ironic contrast to currently prevailing
beliefs that only justiciable disputes may be arbitrated.
In an elaborate study of the state arbitration statutes, made under the
direction of David Ziskind and published by the U.S. Department of
Labor, the following comparison between the "general" and the "spe-
cial" labor statutes was made:
The extent to which court action is regarded as an aid to voluntary arbitration is the
outstanding difference between the statutes designed for labor arbitration alone and
statutes intended for commercial as well as industrial arbitration. None of the statutes
enacted solely for labor disputes makes arbitration agreements irrevocable, or pro-
vides for an injunction to compel persons to proceed to arbitration. ... [M]ost of the
general arbitration statutes do provide that arbitration agreements are irrevocable,
hence the arbitration once voluntarily approved may be enforced by court order under
those statutes. Many of the general arbitration statutes also provide for a rule of court
which makes the arbitration an auxiliary court function and makes possible the use of
court powers in expediting the proceedings or in enforcing the award. None of the
special labor statutes has such a provision. The general statutes usually provide for
court appeals from awards and for definite steps to convert awards into court judg-
ments. The labor statutes contain fewer references to court appeals and court judg-
ments; nearly all of them merely declare the arbitration awards to be binding or final.
There is much greater reliance in the labor statutes upon the common-law procedure
of filing separate court actions to enforce awards than upon the direct translation of
awards into court judgments, found in most of the general statutes.
Instead of stressing the inviolability of arbitration contracts, the approach of many
of the special labor statutes to the arbitration of labor disputes is to provide for perma-
nent officials charged with the duty of encouraging resort to arbitration.sS
Indeed, in some instances the special statutes have had a negative
effect upon the "inviolability of arbitration contracts." Where before it
S3 For example: Minn., Ch. 364, L. 1938 and Ch. ii, L. i939; vId., Ch. 938, L. 1945 (re-
port assigning blame must be published in a newspaper).
S4 The Illinois special labor statute, passed in 1895, provides that any controversy between
an employer and an employee not involving a question which may be the subject of an action
at law or bill in equity may be arbitrated. Ill. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. Io, §§ 20-30.
'5 Labor Arbitration under State Statutes (U.S. Dep't of Labor, 1943).
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had been assumed that a general statute which enforced arbitration
agreements was applicable to labor agreements, the "special" type of
statute has had the effect, in one instance at least, of inducing a court to
read industrial arbitration out of the general statute.56
There is no question that the great mass of these special labor arbitra-
tion statutes are "dead letters." Some of them are completely outmoded.
The statutes designed to encourage arbitration are commendable. The
others, however, either attempt to dodge the issue by simply providing
facilities for arbitration which the parties may use, or else they go too
far in seeking to intrude state-selected arbitrators into the situation. The
criticism of the first method is that, if the parties want to arbitrate, elabo-
rate facilities are not needed. The second method is undesirable because
either one side or the other will almost always be prejudiced against
using the state arbitration machinery. If the only permissible means of
arbitrating is to submit the dispute to a state-created tribunal, there
probably will not be any arbitrating. From a study of the strikes settled
with the help of the United States government during the years 1938-42,
based on the annual report of strikes issued by the Division of Industrial
Relations in the Department of Labor, Professor Braun draws the con-
clusion that conciliation was acceptable where government officials or
boards carried on the negotiations, but that when arbitration was neces-
sary, the parties were more willing to submit to it when private persons
or private boards were used.57
III. CURRENT ATTITUDES TOWARD ARBITRATION
Thus it is seen that the only state statutes which might be used to
enforce industrial arbitration agreements-the "general" statutes-
either exclude the labor contract, apply only to "justiciable disputes," or
are confined, in the overwhelming majority of instances, to the enforce-
ment of submission agreements. The exclusion of contracts between em-
ployers and employees from the operative effects of the "general"
statutes is the result partly of historical development, as has already
been noted, partly of a fear of violating the constitutional injunction
against involuntary servitude, and partly due to the opposition of organ-
s6 The Illinois statute passed in i895, while providing that the parties could avail themselves
of the Illinois Department of Labor for mediation and/or arbitration, made no provision for
enforcing the arbitration agreement. In i917 Illinois enacted a "general" arbitration statute,
making agreements to arbitrate existing disputes enforcible. ll. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. xo, §§ I-
18. Recently an Illinois court announced, obiter, that since the 1895 statute mentions labor,
and the general statute does not, the general statute does not apply to labor-management
agreements. In re Matter of William Cregaer, 323 ll. App. 594 (1944).
57 Braun, The Settlement of Industrial Disputes iS, 16 (1944).
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ized labor to the inclusion. The first of these, the historical explanation,
is simply that the commercial world felt the need for these arbitration
statutes long before the industrial world did. The statutes were promul-
gated and presented by commercial interests, and any stipulation at all
concerning labor was an afterthought. There is nothing in this explana-
tion that goes to the merits of the exclusion.
In the face of union and management pronouncements of their prefer-
ence to arbitrate, it is puzzling to learn that organized labor is in good
measure responsible for the exclusion of the collective bargaining agree-
ment from the terms of the "general" arbitration statutes. As with the
first explanation, the reasons here are also primarily historical, based
upon the varying attitudes of judges, legislatures and labor leaders oper-
ating in a constantly shifting social and political context. The previous
discussion of the state statutes reflects labor's antagonisms toward the
courts amply. An outgrowth of this attitude was organized labor's deci-
sion to rely only on self-help and to reject all other sanctions to enforce
collective bargains. This attitude can be assigned as the basic reason for
the AFL's opposition to the 194o amendment of the New York
Arbitration statute which made, or was designed to make, practically
any labor-management agreement to arbitrate valid and enforcible.58
It is hard to believe that this opposition was based upon any general
objection to arbitration; and it is doubtful whether objection would
generally be made today.5 9
On the whole, organized labor has come around and now recognizes
the arbitration agreement, not as a device to enlist the aid of the courts
on the side of the employer, but as a device to further collective rule-
making along lines designed as closely as possible to execute the inten-
tion of the private parties concerned. Moreover, labor unions now recog-
nize this device as a peaceful method of preserving bitterly-won bargain-
ing gains. And arbitration affords interludes of peace in the never-ending
struggle involved in collective bargaining. Labor is still wary of the
courts, but there is a growing recognition on the part of labor that the
courts, in enforcing agreements to arbitrate, are fulfilling the judicial
58 Note the discussion of this amendment p. 249 infra.
59 The latest pronouncements of labor spokesmen indicate a strong policy on the part of
labor favoring voluntary arbitration. See Woll [counsel for the A.F. of L.], The Adverse Effect
on the Principle of Voluntary Arbitration of the Taft-Hartley Act..., 3 Arb. J. (N.S.) 46
(1948). However, at least one recent instance must be noted of effective opposition on the part
of labor to legislation which would have made future-disputes clauses enforcible. The Illinois
Federation of Labor was responsible in large measure for the defeat of such a proposal before
the Illinois legislature in the~spring of 1949.
ENFORCEMENT OF LABOR AGREEMENTS 247
function of protecting the valid expectations of the parties and are no
longer imposing anti-union sanctions like the labor injunction.
The fear of violating the constitutional mandate prohibiting involun-
tary servitude has proved baseless in enforcing agreements to arbitrate.
The same argument has been made against the enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements generally. States which have enforced both types
of agreements have not run into constitutional difficulties.6" The analogy
between personal service contracts and collective bargaining agreements
seems specious. The collective bargaining agreement is not labor's sur-
render to involuntary servitude, but its answer to it.
The real points of stress in the law of arbitration today arise from
questions as to whether arbitration of nonjusticiable disputes should be
enforced, and whether future-disputes clauses as well as submission
agreements should be enforced. The objection to enforcing future-dis-
putes clauses has been dealt with previously6 in discussing the fear that
if such agreements were enforced "the strong would oppress the weak."
The real explanation probably is that the legislatures have been afraid to
overturn a rigid common-law rule of ancient origin. Since the Draft
State Arbitration Act, and its adoption by New York in 1920, no serious
argument has been advanced for refusing to enforce future-disputes
clauses (at least in a jurisdiction that is willing to enforce arbitration
agreements at all). Of course, it has been said that it seems more repre-
hensible for a party to back out of an agreement to arbitrate entered
into after a dispute has arisen, than for a party to ignore such an agree-
ment consummated before the dispute arose. In the latter situation, the
party reneging contends that he did not anticipate that particular type of
dispute. Similarly, disputes as to the interpretation and application of a
contract are always foreseeable-but this may not be as true of the
"bargaining dispute." One wonders whether, at bottom, the objection to
enforcing future-disputes clauses is not the same as the objection to the
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate nonjusticiable disputes: namely,
that they are so difficult to foresee that the parties could not have con-
templated their effect in the initial negotiations. But unforeseen prob-
lems may arise under every contract, and this fact has not impaired
normal contract obligations. So at best the fear of the "unforeseen"
should result in the position that future justiciable disputes clauses only
6o Compareflarperv. LocalUnion No. 520,48 S.W. 2d 1033 (Tex., 1932); Red CrossLinev.
Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924); Matter of Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, 23o N.Y.
261, 13 o N.E. 288 (1921).
61 P. 239 supra.
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should be enforced, and not that all future-disputes clauses should be
unenforcible. However, an examination of the merits of arbitrating the
industrial nonjusticiable dispute reveals that such a limitation would be
productive of more harm than good.
IV. THE NONJUSTICIABLE DISPUTE
Arbitration of the nonjusticiable dispute is a product largely of indus-
trial relations. Disputes as to union recognition, new wage provisions,
or perhaps a form of union security under an already existing contract
cannot be settled in the courts. If they are to be settled at all, they must
be arbitrated. Nevertheless, the majority of arbitration statutes state
that only disputes which may be the subject of an action at law or suit
in equity can be arbitrated under the statutes. The result is that much of
labor arbitration is excluded from the enforcibility provisions of these
statutes. The requirement itself is anomalous, since at common law any
dispute could be arbitrated.2 The legal sanctions-those there were-
applied to all arbitrations alike. Thus, awards settling nonjusticiable
disputes which would have been upheld at common law may be stricken
as defective under the statute.0 3 It cannot be denied, however, that there
is an essential difference b6tween the arbitration of a dispute arising
under an already established contract-disputes as to "rights"--and the
arbitration of so-called disputes as to "interests," e.g., wage issues and
other collective bargaining matters. These last disputes arise most fre-
quently in the attempt to agree upon the terms of a new contract.
Whether or not their settlement can be brought under the heading of
arbitration at all is a disputed question.
There are those who maintain that this is not arbitration at all. "Real
arbitration would properly seem to imply the disposition of a dispute
in accordance with some standard-possibly a law, a trade practice or a
provision in a contract-which the parties to the dispute concede to
exist, although they cannot agree upon what it means or how it is to be
applied in a particular case." 4 Courts fulfill this sort of function; and
in this sense arbitration is a substitute for the judicial process. Labor-
management groups, however, also use arbitration as a substitute for
collective bargaining. It is not uncommon for labor and management to
submit an adjustment to arbitration if they cannot agree on the pro-
62 See Annotation, 47 L.R.A. (N.S.) 380, 443 (1911).
63 Compare Continental Bank Supply Co. v. Internat'l Brotherhood of Bookbinders, 239
Mo. App. 1247, 201 S.W. 2d 531 (1947).
64 Gregory, Labor and the Law 402 (1946).
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posed changes in the contract or the wage rate. This is especially so in
situations where the contract runs from year to year subject to reopening
provisions for change each year, or where the wage rate is made a flexible
one, determined by the cost-of-living index or business conditions at the
time of renewal. In the sense that the parties have abjured recourse to
further bargaining in situations of this sort, arbitration in these instances
is arguably not a continuation of the collective bargaining process at all.
Collective bargaining in the ordinary sense ended when the parties were
unable to agree on the matter in issue and called in an arbitrator to reach
a decision for them. He is a substitute for a bargaining process which
has broken down in circumstances where the parties could not call in a
court. Indeed, as Mr. Fraenkel has pointed out, the courts cannot use
the "ouster" rationale to refuse to enforce this kind of arbitration, for
the courts would not hear the dispute in any case. 5 Nevertheless, in a
jurisdiction which has been foremost in the enforcement of arbitration
agreements, the court has balked at taking this step.
In the Matter of Buffalo & Erie R. Co.6" the New York Court of
Appeals refused to enforce an agreement to arbitrate a wage provision
in a yearly collective agreement which was up for renewal. The court
found as its stumbling block that "no power exists in the courts to make
contracts for people.... A contract that the court shall determine what
an agreement shall be for the future is unenforcible, unless the lines of
the agreement have been laid out by the parties. '67 In his dissent Judge
Pound commented tersely, "The court makes no contract for the parties.
It enforces one already in existence.168 The New York state legislature
was not persuaded by the argument of the majority, or rather, was con-
vinced of the desirability of arbitrating such disputes, and some time
thereafter amended its arbitration statute in the following manner: "A
provision in a written contract between a labor organization,.. . and em-
ployer or employers ... to settle by arbitration a controversy or contro-
versies thereafter arising between the parties to the contract including
but not restricted to controversies dealing with rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment or other terms or conditions of employment...
shall likewise be valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 69
6s Fraenkel, Civil and Commercial Arbitration Law-The Legal Enforceability of Agree-
ments to Arbitrate Labor Disputes, i Arb. J. 36o (1937).
66 250 N.Y. 275, 165 N.E. 291 (1929). 67 Ibid., at 292. "Ibid., at 293.
69 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act (Thompson, part II [Supp. 1942]) § r448. As the New York statute
was originally written, only disputes which could be the "subject of an action" were arbitrable.
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As a result of this amendnent, the New York courts will now enforce
the arbitration of nonjusticiable labor-management disputes; 70 but they
still refuse to decree the arbitration of disputes arising over the terms
of a new contract.7 ' Resourceful lawyers are already seeking a passage
around this position, writing collective agreements in such a manner that
changes or modifications in the agreement may be arbitrated under the
guise of the old contract. Thus, while paying lip service to the New York
doctrine, a New Jersey court enforced an agreement to reopen and to
arbitrate the question as to whether certain wage adjustments stipulated
in a contract were to become effective or not.72 Under such a view any
reopening provision would pass muster as an arbitrable matter under an
existing contract. It is apparent that the arbitrator would be faced with
much the same problems involved in a dispute over a clause in a new
contract.
It is not difficult to see the underlying basis of the New York doctrine.
It is the spectre of "compulsory arbitration" that has frightened the
courts. The perils of forcing parties to arbitrate the provisions of a new
contract are obvious. The parties are deprived of the ultimate sanctions
of collective bargaining-recourse to self-help. The contract is imposed
from above, rather than proposed from below. But the situation would
appear to be somewhat different when the parties have agreed to arbi-
trate provisions of the new contract. There the consensual element is
present. The parties have voluntarily forsworn their privileges of self-
help. They have defined the jurisdiction of the arbitrator; they have pro-
vided a means for submitting the dispute to him; and they have deter-
mined at what point-probably only after complex conciliation and
mediation procedures have been followed-the dispute will be sub-
mitted. And, most important, they have provided for the selection of
their own arbitrator. Thus, if compulsory arbitration be a spectre in this
situation, it is indeed an illusive one.
A more substantial objection to enforcing the arbitration of disputes
concerning new contract provisions is the absence of any fixed criteria
or standard to guide the arbitrator in his deliberations. The arbitrator
70 Compare Local 474, Natl Food Chain Store Employees, CIO v. Safeway Stores, 274
App. Div. 779, 8 iN.Y.S. 2d 142 (1948) (order to arbitrate dispute over change of normalwork-
ing hours); In the Matter of Miroflex Products Co., 192 N.Y. Misc. 673, 8o N.Y.S. 2d 788
(1948) (whether salary may be reduced is a proper matter for arbitration).
71 Marseillaise French Baking Co. v. O'Rourke, 121 N.YJ,.. 1270 (1948); cf. Kallus v. Ideal
Novelty and Toy Co., 292 N.Y. 459, 55 N.E. 2d 737 (1944); Ford Instrument Co. v. Dillon,
77 N.Y.S. 2d 72 (1947).
72 United E. R. & M. Workers v. Nat'l Pneumatic Co., i34 N.J.L. 349, 48 A. 2d 295 (1946).
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is on the spot. The area of the parties' demands somewhat delimits his
task; but this is apt to be deceptive. If the arbitrator is an expert in the
particular industry he may have enough knowledge of analogous past
situations to guide him in reaching his decision. Certainly, such an arbi-
trator would have enjoyed the full confidence of both parties when he
was selected, and probably would continue to do so, although one party
came to believe that it would get more by self-help. Surely if such earlier
confidence was at all warranted, his decision should be more acceptable
than one achieved by recourse to industrial warfare.
More and more, as arbitrators gain experience in arbitrating such dis-
putes, governing principles will be evolved. It has already been claimed,
"The arbitration of a wage dispute is not an unpredictable process., 7 3
But a more realistic conclusion would seem to be that of David Cole,
who admits: "It may fairly be said that at present the setting of wages
is a subjective matter, and that it varies with the arbitrator. This is not
as hazardous as it sounds, however, because the purposes and philoso-
phies of the several arbitrators is [sic] quite well known to the parties
before they are selected." 74
It is unfortunate that a refusal by the courts to enforce arbitration
of the nonjusticiable dispute is tantamount to their decreeing industrial
strife. These are the most vexing disputes-the ones over which unions
are most likely to strike. Furthermore, the result is almost bound to be
that someone will lose an advantage which he thought he had secured
in the contract and will be adversely affected by changes in the bar-
gaining climate against which he had tried to guard in the agreement
itself.
Disputes, strikes, and other forms of labor-management warfare are
bound to occur in a free-enterprise society, and as one writer has ob-
served,75 "[T]he best technique of reducing their number is the creation
of labor conditions which satisfy both parties to the greatest possible
extent. A further condition of smoothly functioning labor-management
relations is the unconditional acknowledgment of the sanctity of con-
tracts and the necessity of absolute adherence to all contractual obli-
gations." Combining this thought with the similarly basic principle that
in "true" arbitration the parties are free to select their own arbitrator,
there seems to be no reason why the parties to a labor dispute should not
2 Justin, Arbitrating a Wage Dispute Case, 3 Arb. J. (N.S.) 228 (1948).
74 Cole, Fixed Criteria in Wage Rate Arbitration?, 3Arb. J. (N.S.) 169, 174 (1948). Mr.
Cole is Chairman of the Basic Steel Panel of the NLRB.
7sBraun, The Settlement of Industrial Disputes 21 (1944).
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be compelled to honor their voluntary commitments to arbitrate a dis-
pute over the terms of a new contract, or any other nonjusticiable matter.
V. ARBiTRATioN OF G iEvANCES
Vital as the arbitration of disputes concerning "interests" may be, by
far the most important and widespread use of arbitration in the labor
relations field has been in the disposition of grievances arising under col-
lective agreements. This has resulted in the transfer of disputes con-
cerning "rights" from the judicial to the arbitral arena. An integral part
of the modern collective agreement is a grievance procedure-a device
for the settlement of claims arising from alleged violations of contract
provisions. This procedure is usually reserved for disputes over the
interpretation or application of the collective agreement, with arbitra-
tion as the last step of the procedure, to be used after all efforts to settle
grievances by bargaining have failed. There may be four or five steps
in a grievance procedure. The aggrieved employee may be required first
to take up his "claim" or grievance with his foreman; then, if no settle-
ment is reached, a union representative will be called in. The next step,
provided no settlement has been effected, will involve a conference with
higher officials of the company and, perhaps, of the union as well. The
last steps require meetings between the union representatives and com-
pany officials, perhaps providing ultimately for a conference between
national representatives of the local's union and top management. The
final action will be submission to arbitration.
From this it becomes apparent that arbitration facilities and pro-
ceedings must be so effective that the contending groups will submit to
these procedures rather than resort to industrial warfare or litigation.
The dispute may not be a "large" one, but if it gets to the arbitrator
it is going to be a sharply contested one. "Hence arbitration, as the final
step of the grievance procedure, provides an adequate means of settling
these disputed issues, a perfect face-saving device for the parties who are
at loggerheads, each hating to back down, and a convenient technique
for the avoidance of the kinds of frictions that eventually boil over into
strikes. '7
The courts are not equipped to fulfill this arbitral function. In liti-
gation the object of each party is to win his immediate objectives. The
procedure can end only in victory for one party and defeat for the other;
for except within very narrow limits a judge cannot couch his decisions
76 Gregory & Katz, Labor Law, Cases, Materials and Comments ii98 (1948).
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in the fluid and casual terms familiar to arbitrators. Of greater impor-
tance, however, is the circumstance that the strict judicial process is not
conducive to good will and amicable relations. Litigants are strangers,
for the most part; employers and employees live together. Continuous
adjustment and not permanent disposition of the occasional matter of
disagreement, is the result desired. The fact that settlement by arbitra-
tion is a friendlier method than court proceedings, the greater infor-
mality of arbitration, the parties' greater influence in the composition
of the deciding tribunal, and the formulation of their own rules of pro-
cedure, all argue for submitting the dispute to this extra-judicial pro-
cedure. An additional reason for labor disputants choosing arbitration
is that they can be represented on the arbitration board. Whether or not
it is justified,77 the undeniable effect of this is to induce greater faith in
the competence of the deciding tribunal. Finally, the peaceful settlement
of the labor dispute cannot await the convenience of crowded court
calendars.
The judicial tradition itself has not been one to generate confidence
in labor disputants. Of late the realization has become current that while
courts may be impartial between man and man in proper controversies,
there is not so much assurance that they can achieve the same impar-
tiality between contending groups of employers and employees. It may
be argued that it is equally difficult for an arbitrator to be impartial.
This may be true, but in arbitration, at least, the parties are able to select
the peculiar "conglomeration of prejudices" which they believe will lead
to the most expedient adjustment. The arbitrator in all probability will
be an expert in labor-management relations. Moreover, he is not ex-
pected, as is the judge, to apply legal principles solely. He is expected to
employ ethical concepts and precepts of behavior resting upon custom or
public opinion. (Of course, it cannot be gainsaid that some judges follow
7Judge Evans found the partisan arbitrator an anomaly. In a suit to impeach an award
settling a wage dispute under the Railway Labor Act, 48 Stat. 1185 (i934), 45 U.S.C.A. §15i
(1943), where the arbitrators had been unable to agree at first sitting, Judge Evans com-
mented, "An open-minded consideration of the questions at issue can hardly be expected where
arbitrators are chosen to represent contestants. It is somewhat of a misnomer to call them
arbitrators. They are advocates. If could hardly be expected that such partisans would surren-
der one iota of their claims until the arrival of the psychological moment for concessions.
"And such contentions of the partisan members, persistently asserted, would prove dis-
couraging to the neutral arbitrators whose inclinations and desires would be to terminate their
labors before exhausting all efforts to reach an agreement.
"... Doubtless it [Congress]... acted on the assumption that these [partisan] members
would bring to the body as a whole, information and experience that would be valuable. But,
at the same time, it necessarily made a speedy disposition of the controversy more difficult."
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen,
26 F. 2d 413, 419 (C.C.A. 7th, 1928).
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the same process, but it is more difficult to convince a layman of this.)
All in all, it must be conceded that the arbitrator brings something to the
labor-management dispute which a judge could not bring to it.
VI. STATE ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
In the various states the movement toward enforcement of industrial
arbitration agreements has already started. Delaware has been the first
to enact a special labor statute that expressly enforces arbitration agree-
ments.7" The state of Washington's old "general" statute had excluded
labor agreements unless the parties had specifically provided in the
agreement that the statute was to apply. This was amended in 1947
to provide that employers and unions may agree upon any method and
procedure for the settlement of existing and future disputes and their
agreements be valid and enforcible to the same degree as any other
contract.
79
In view of the fact that the first statutory undertaking to enforce
future-disputes clauses in arbitration agreements (including labor-man-
agement agreements) occurred in 192o, a trend toward greater enforci-
bility is apparent, in spite of its slow beginning. The courts, also, have
responded somewhat to the demand for enforcement of these agree-
ments. Indeed, the Minnesota court has taken the incredible step of
overturning the common-law rule!80 The only other state court to have
gone so far is the Colorado Supreme Court, which accomplished the
same result as early as 1925 with no disturbing repercussions.", These
decisions constitute an important step ahead; for despite the many stat-
utes in this field the influence of the common law remains potent. This
is because in all but one of our states " the parties have the choice of
following the statutory procedure or of formulating their own rules.
But if they choose the latter course, the arbitration is governed by
common-law principles. The statutes have been held merely to have
supplemented the common law, not to have overturned it. 8 Thus, most
78 Del. L. (1947) c. 196, § 7. 79 Wash. L. (i947) C. 209.
8o Park Construction Co. v. Independent School District, 209 Minn. 182, 296 N.W. 475
(1941).
81 Ezell v. Rocky Mountain Bean & Elevator Co., 76 Colo. 409, 232 Pac. 68o (1925).
8 The courts in the state of Washington have declared that with the passage of their state
arbitration act common-law arbitrations disappeared in Washington. Compare Gord v. F. S.
Harmon & Co., i88 Wash. 134, 6i P. 2d 1294 (i936).
83 Compare Cockrill v. Stamoules, 68 Cal. App. 2d x84, 156 P. 2d 265 (i945); Alexan-
der v. Fletcher, 2o6 Ark. 9o6, 175 S.W. 2d 196 (r943); Sukonik v. Shapiro, 333 Pa. 289, 5 A.
2d xoS (1939); Ezell v. Rocky Mountain Bean & Elevator Co., 76 Colo. 409, 232 Pac. 68o
(192!;).
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of the state courts have two possible legal agencies whereby they may
enforce arbitration agreements. One is the common law, which would
necessitate reversing many old decisions, and the other is applying,
wherever possible, the arbitration statutes of the state. Obviously this
latter alternative can have only limited success.
The courts of Pennsylvania long ago decided that the exclusion in
Pennsylvania's arbitration statute of "personal service contracts" did
not apply to collective bargaining agreements."4 Since that exclusion was
inserted to avoid violation of the constitutional prohibition of involun-
tary servitude-an objection clearly inapplicable in the situation before
the court-this construction appears well justified. Of late, however,
this interpretation has been questioned. The Pennsylvania arbitration
act has been held not to apply to an arbitration proceeding in which the
union requested an award for the reinstatement of an employee.,5 Thus,
the situation in Pennsylvania appears to be that the nature of the dis-
pute, and not the fact that it arises under a collective agreement, is the
determining factor as to whether the statute may be used to enforce
the agreement.
The California courts, on the other hand, have had to hold that col-
lective bargaining agreements are not "contracts pertaining to labor"
in order to make enforcible arbitration clauses appearing in such agree-
ments. " The California arbitration statute is one of the Draft State
type, making agreements to arbitrate irrevocable, except that ".... the
provisiens of this title shall not apply to contracts pertaining to labor. 87
A suit was brought by a garment workers' union to enforce an arbi-
tration award. The defendant pleaded that the agreement, and hence
the award, was not enforcible at common law and had not been made
enforcible by statute. But the court found that a collective bargaining
agreement was not a contract "pertaining to labor" within the meaning
of the California statute and specifically enforced the award. On the
face of it this seems far-fetched, 8 but the California Supreme Court
justified its position by pointing out that the exception had been made
in its statute, as in Pennsylvania's, to afford protection against possible
involuntary servitude.
84 Kaplan v. Bagrier, 12 Pa. D. & Co. Rep. 693 (1929).
8s Retail Drug Union v. Sun Ray Drug Co., 12 B.N.A. Lab. Arb. 418 (Pa. Ct. C.P., 1949).
86 Levy v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 2d 692, io4 P. 2d 770 (1940).
87 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Bender-Moss, x947) part 3, tit. X, § 1280.
8 A note in 14 So. Calif. L. Rev. 64 (194o) criticizes the court for distorting the statute.
See 29 Calif. L. Rev. 411 (1941) for a more sympathetic critique.
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Some courts, however, have been unable to construe their statutes in
such manner. The Ohio General Arbitration Act is fairly explicit in ex-
cluding labor contracts. It provides that "the provisions of this act shall
not apply to (a) collective or individual contracts between employers
and employees in respect to terms or conditions of employment." 9 In
the face of this unambiguous language, the Ohio courts feel that their
hands are tied. In refusing to enforce an arbitration agreement, in a suit
brought by a union to compel a recalcitrant utility company to arbi-
trate, a lower Ohio court declared: "The Court is not adverse to ac-
cepting the view that all valid contracts made by mature men should be
specifically enforced; that pretexts should not be resorted to, to evade
them; and that where no argument exists based on reason and justice
or common morality for avoiding a valid agreement, compulsory per-
formance of such agreements should be decreed. Yet no Court can con-
travene positive legislative enactments, or ignore the pronouncements
of its superior courts."9 It should be noted in passing that Ohio has
three special labor arbitration statutes designed to promote and encour-
age the arbitration of labor disputes.
The prospects for establishing state enforcement of industrial arbi-
tration agreements do not appear bright. Only the most vigorous and
daring of courts seem willing and able to break through the dark and
tangled web of precedent on the subject. And even courts capable of the
most liberal statutory construction are confronted by statutes which
close the door firmly against enforcement. True, a statutory trend
toward enforcement of these agreements is discernible in the states, but
this at best is an unwieldy solution. Even if the process of persuading
state legislatures to amend their arbitration laws were a reasonable or
practical one, this solution would not be completely satisfactory. For
lack of uniformity is bound to ensue (at least, it has in everything else
the states have done); and in the peculiar context of labor relations,
uniformity of law is essential if agreements to arbitrate are to be effec-
tively enforced.
With the growth of national labor organizations and the resulting
unionization of whole industries, the "master collective bargaining
agreement" has come upon the scene, governing large segments of labor-
management relationships on a sectional or nation-wide basis. These
agreements are drawn so as to cover an international union and all of
89 Ohio Code Ann. (Throckmorton, 1940) § 12148-1.
go Utility Workers Union v. Ohio Power Co., 36 Ohio Ops. 324, 326, 77 N.E. 2d 629, 632(1947).
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its locals, as well as a corporate employer and all of its widespread
plants organized by that union. Indeed, some of them cover many com-
panies. Thus, such agreements may cover employment units in a great
number of jurisdictions, spread over the length and breadth of the
United States. Under a "master contract" negotiated in Chicago, a
grievance may arise in Utah and, perhaps, be arbitrated in a third state.
This would present almost insuperable problems of enforcement in the
present context of widely varying judicial attitudes and the complex
set of conflicts-of-law rules in which the subject is enveloped.
Much of the confusion and instability surrounding the enforcement
of arbitration agreements stems from the fact that, by and large, each
state will treat an arbitration agreement according to the dictates of its
own legal attitude on the subject. Unlike other contracts, the place where
the agreement was made, and even the intention of the parties as to
which law will apply, likely as not will be ignored. This conflicts-of-law
result is an outgrowth of two completely dissimilar attitudes toward arbi-
tration. The first of these was the early conviction of some courts that
the agreement should not be enforced. The second was the attitude
deemed necessary to safeguard the constitutionality of the new arbi-
tration statutes. Both of these positions were achieved by labeling the
arbitration provisions as a "procedural" remedy." This enabled courts
to refuse to enforce foreign-made agreements to arbitrate on the ground
that procedure was a matter for the forum to decide. " And later, de-
cisions upholding the constitutionality of arbitration statutes were fa-
cilitated by regarding such statutes as mere regulations of the procedures
which the courts were to follow. 93 The result of all this has been that an
agreement to arbitrate is valid or invalid according to the laws of the
state in which the agreement is made; but whether or not the agreement
will be enforced is for the law of the forum to decide. It is apparent that
such a doctrine can produce only confusion and unpredictability.
As one writer has pointed out, the courts stuffed the arbitration clause
91 Phillips traces the origins of "lex fori" as applied to arbitration cases in Arbitration and
Conflicts of Laws: A Study of Benevolent Compulsion, x9 Corn. L.Q. 197, 213 et seq. (1934).
92Meachem v. Jamestown Ry., 211 N.Y. 346, 1o5 N.E. 653 (1914).
93 Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 230 N.Y. 26r, 13o N.E. 288 (1921). This approach
can be rationalized in suitable legal terminology. As Justice Brandeis spid, "The substantive
right created by an agreement to submit disputes to arbitration is recognized as a perfect obli-
gation.... The reluctance of the federal court goes merely to the remedy." Red Cross Line v.
Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 1o9, T23 (1924). Previously the federal rule had been that the
state arbitration acts could not affect the power of the federal courts. The agreement was void
no matter where made. Lappe v. Wilcox, 14 F. 2d 861 (1926); United States Asphalt Refining
Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., Ltd., 222 Fed. ioo6 (D.C.N.Y., r9r5).
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into the "procedure" pigeonhole in order to effectuate their policy no-
tions on the matter. 4 Still, the law today would be much simpler if
courts had merely refused to enforce these agreements on policy grounds
alone rather than by achieving their ends through dressing up these
clauses in unsuitable clothing. The arbitration clause is hard to distin-
guish from any other clause in the contract, and the line between "sub-
stance" and "procedure" is a shadowy one indeed. In England, for ex-
ample, the enforcement of an arbitration agreement is considered a
matter of substance, to be determined by the law of the place of per-
formance. 5
In late years the federal courts have placed the arbitration clause in
its proper context in the law of contracts. The Supreme Court, albeit
without departing from the doctrine that the enforcibility of these
agreements is a matter of procedure, has announced that the federal
courts will determine whether or not to enforce an arbitration agree-
ment by looking to the law of the place where the agreement had been
made. 6 Thus, if the agreement to arbitrate had been made in a state
which provides for enforcement, an action in a federal court on a dis-
pute arising under the contract will be stayed pending compliance with
the arbitration provision. Otherwise the suit will be entertained. The
result is certainly a step toward consistency in the enforcement of arbi-
tration agreements; but so long as the state courts cling to the conflicts
rule that enforcement will be decreed or refused according to the law of
the forum, the step will have little effect.
Awards, on the other hand, have received a more consistent judicial
treatment than that accorded the unexecuted agreement. In keeping
with the common-law view that the award would be sanctioned legally
even though the bare agreement would not, 7 most states will enforce
an award rendered in a foreign state. Of course, the speedy remedies
provided by the modern statutes are not available to enforce an award
handed down in a foreign state, 98 but the award can be enforced by
94 Phillips, op. cit. supra note 91.
9s Hamlyn & Co. v. Talisker Distillery, [1894] A.C. 202; Spurrier v. LaCloche, [1902] A.C.
446.
96 Shanferoke Coal and Supply Corp. v. Westchester Service Corp., 293 U.S. 449 (i934).
97 Cases and authority cited note 8 supra.
98 The power of the court to enforce awards summarily stems from the arbitration statute.
In the absence of specific statutory authority the common-law method is the only method
available for enforcing foreign awards. United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of Amer-
ica (U.E.) v. General Electric Co., 193 N.Y. Misc. 146, 83 N.Y.S. 2d 768 (1948).
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bringing an action on it almost anywhere,99 in much the same manner
as foreign judgments are enforced.'00 The award will be considered final
and binding upon the issue-unless the state is one with a strong policy
against enforcement. That is, if a court regards the agreement as com-
pletely void because against public policy-and several so regard future-
disputes clauses-the award, foreign or domestic, will not be given any
binding effect.'01
It is readily apparent that state regulation of the labor-management
agreement to arbitrate not only brings about the usual irregularities of
interpretation and application (the same collective agreement means
different things in different states), but places the element of enforci-
bility literally beyond the control of the parties. Either party can frus-
trate the agreement with a fair degree of ease. If any sort of reliability
is to be injected into the field of labor arbitration, some degree of uni-
formity or control must be achieved. An appropriate federal arbitration
statute would solve many of the current ills, although certainly not all
of them. And, further, if both state and federal courts could be per-
suaded to abandon the "procedural" label which has been affixed to the
enforcement of agreements, the whole affair might become quite manage-
able. It is likely that the first achievement will come more readily than
the second.
VII. FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF INDUSTRIAL
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
The movement toward a federal industrial arbitration statute has been
propelled in the federal courts, as in the state courts, by judicial discon-
tent with the existing situation. Dissatisfaction with the present federal
arbitration statute has been expressed through disagreement as to how
that statute is to be applied, and whether or not the federal statute ex-
cludes contracts between employers and employees from its operative
terms. Some of the federal courts of appeal have already applied the
statute to arbitration clauses contained in collective agreements. The
present Federal Arbitration Act is an outgrowth of the Draft State Act
promulgated by the American Arbitration Association, and although it
99 Compare Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 12r (1924) where the cases
are cited.
100 See 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws 1249 (1935) and cases cited therein.
N. Compare Shafer v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distributing Corp., 36 Ohio App. 3 r , 172
N.E. 689 (1929), refusing to enforce a foreign award; Gilbert v. Burnstein, 255 N.Y. 348,
x74 N.E. 7o6 (1931), enforcing a foreign award.
26o THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
differs in some important respects it is modeled closely upon the New
York act. Fostered by maritime and commercial interests, the whole
Act was drafted before any thought was given to the labor contract.
Apparently as an afterthought the words of exclusion were appended to
the first section of the Act. 02 The first section of this statute does
nothing more than define "maritime transactions" and "commerce," and
ends with the proviso that "nothing herein contained shall apply to con-
tracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class
of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." The second sec-
tion makes valid and enforcibleall arbitration agreements appearing in
any maritime transaction or "contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce."
Section 3 of the Federal Act empowers the federal courts to stay court
proceedings in any case where the issue involved is referable to arbi-
tration under a written agreement. This section, set out in a footnote
below,103 is phrased very broadly and, on its face, appears applicable to
any suit brought upon any issue referable to arbitration. There is a
question, however, whether the exclusion in Section i applies through-
out the act or merely delimits the definitions of "commerce" and "mari-
time transaction," neither of which terms is used in Section 3. In suits
filed by employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act 01 to collect
unpaid overtime wages from their employers, the federal courts have
split upon the question as to whether the proceeding should be stayed
pending arbitration as provided in the applicable collective bargaining
contracts, or whether the suit should be entertained. The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit has taken a broad view of Section 3 and a
narrow view of Section i. Finding that claims arising under the Fair
Labor Standards Act were legal rights which may be arbitrated, Judge
Goodrich in two cases 05 ordered the actions stayed until the arbitrations
were held. This same court has maintained this view in later cases. 06
-' judge Parker maintains that the exclusionary clause was added because "Congress was
steering clear of compulsory arbitration of labor disputes.. . ." Int'l Union United Furniture
Workers v. Colonial Hardwood Floor Co., z68 F. 2d 33, 36 (C.C.A. 4th, I948).
X03 Section 3 reads: "If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United
States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitra-
tion, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in
such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such agreement, shall on applicaton of
one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance
with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in pro-
ceeding with such arbitration." 61 Stat. 669 (1947), 9 U.S.C.A. § 3 (Supp. 1948).
104 52 Stat. Io6o (1938), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-219 (1947).
XOS Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 138 F. 2d 3 (C.C.A. 3d, 1943); Watkins v. Hud.
son Coal Co., 151 F. 2d 311 (C.C.A. 3d, 1945).
zo
6 Evans v. Hudson Coal Co., 165 F. 2d 970 (C.C.A. 3d, 1948).
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The Sixth Circuit, however, only a year after the Donahue case, read the
exclusionary clause to apply to the whole Act and refused to order a
stay.'07 Early indications were that the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit had joined Judge Goodrich, 08 but last year Judge Parker took
an opportunity to clarify his court's position. This was in a suit brought
by an employer against a labor union and its local under Sections 301
and 303109 of the Taft-Hartley Act to recover damages arising from a
strike."10 In refusing to order a stay, Judge Parker based the decision
upon the fact that the arbitration clause in the collective bargaining con-
tract had no relation to such claims of damage. He went on to say that
the Federal Arbitration Act could not be applied to enforce such an arbi-
tration agreement, adopting the view (and taking direct issue with Judge
Goodrich) that the exception of contracts of employment in the first
section applied to the whole Act.
There the situation lies. The Third Circuit is willing to make the labor
arbitration agreement subject to the "stay" provisions of Section 3 of
the Federal Arbitration Act. The Fourth and Sixth Circuits have lined
up against this procedure. In the Watkins case, however, the Supreme
Court denied certiorari,"' possibly indicating agreement with the Third
Circuit. In any case, the result is to further the legal confusion sur-
rounding arbitration in this country. Of greater significance than this,
perhaps, is the fact that the disagreement of the federal courts of appeal
has made ambiguous those provisions of the Taft-Hartley law which
touch the industrial arbitration agreement. Thus, whether an arbitration
clause limits the ability of a party to sue under Section 301 of the Taft-
Hartley Act," 2 which authorizes suits in the federal courts for violation
of collective bargaining contracts, is a matter of doubt. At this writing
no pronouncement upon this question has been made. Obviously, if
Judge Parker's views are to prevail, the labor-management arbitration
clause will command little respect in the federal courts. Under Judge
Goodrich's view of the Federal Arbitration Act, however, it might still
1O7 Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F. 2d 876 (C.C.A. 6th, z944).
,os Compare Agostini Bros. Bldg. Corp. v. United States, i4. F. 2d 854 (C.C.A. 4 th, 1944),
where judge Parker held that the power of the court to grant a "stay" under Section 3 of the
Arbitration Act was not limited by the provisions of Section 2 which make valid and en-
forcible only arbitration agreements "in any contract or maritime transaction or transaction
involving commerce." [6i Stat. 672 (i947), 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (Supp. 1948).]
lo9 6r Stat. i56, 29 U.S.C.A. § i85 (Supp. 1948).
110 Int'l Union United Furniture Workers v. Colonial Hardwood Floor Co., 168 F. 2d 33,
36 (C.C.A. 4 th, 1948).
-z* Watkins v. Hudson Coal Co., 1z1 F. 2d 311 (C.C.A. 3 d, 1945), cert. den. 327 U.S. 777
(1946).
11 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C.A. § 8.5 (Supp. 1948).
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be possible for one of the contracting parties to stay an action brought
under Section 301 pending arbitration.
To make the labor-management arbitration agreement enforcible only
by use of the "stay" provision of the Federal Arbitration Act is, at best,
a half-hearted result which cannot prove of much value. The "stay"
provision is certainly a necessary condition to the enforcement of arbi-
tration agreements. But without the other two provisions for enforce-
ment-that giving the court the power to compel arbitration by an order,
and the collateral method of empowering the court to appoint arbitrators
-the effect of this "stay" must be to prolong industrial strife rather than
to shorten it. For neither party could compel the other to arbitrate or to
choose arbitrators; and each would be foreclosed from suing on the
cause in court. It is evident that if any effective action is to be taken to
enforce industrial arbitration agreements it must be taken by Congress.
If the enforcibility of these agreements be a goal, a federal statute is the
solution.
There are two methods of enforcing arbitration agreements through
federal statutes which appear the most feasible. The first is to amend
the existing Federal Arbitration Act to make the whole statute clearly
applicable to contracts between employers and employees. The second
method would be to add a section to the National Labor Relations Act
which would make it an unfair labor practice for an employer or a labor
union to fail to comply with an arbitrator's award, or refuse to comply
with the terms of an arbitration clause set forth in a collective bargaining
agreement.1113
There are many advantages to be gained from amending the present
federal arbitration statute. Not only is the statute well drawn, on the
whole, but it has had the benefit of almost thirty years of judicial con-
struction. At the present time the Act provides that arbitration agree-
ments in a "contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce"
as well as maritime contracts are valid and enforcible. This jurisdic-
tional requirement would have to be changed to something like that of
the National Labor Relations Act, so that agreements between em-
ployers and employees engaged in "industries affecting commerce" could
be made valid and enforcible under the Federal Act. The constitutional
difficulties formerly presented by such a clause have long been sur-
mounted. Of course, the exclusionary clause in the first section would
have to be stricken.
Aside from this, little change would be necessary. The Act is fairly
113 See Teller, A Labor Policy for America, c. 8, p. 171 et seq. (1945), where this suggestion
was advanced.
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general in its terms and, it is believed, capable of widespread applica-
tion. Any arbitration agreement would be enforcible "save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."
The Act is not confined to "justiciable disputes" and thus agreements
as to "interests" would be arbitrable. Future-disputes clauses are ex-
pressly made irrevocable, thus making the Act of practical value in the
field of labor relations. If the judicial development in those states having
similar statutes is any indication, the federal courts would no doubt
assume jurisdiction to determine whether a dispute was or was not
arbitrable." 4 The only formal requirement of the arbitration agree-
ment is that it be in writing, although, of course, the agreement must
fulfill the requirements of a valid contract.
Three methods of enforcement-taken from the original Draft State
Act-are provided in the Federal Act: (i) direct enforcement of arbi-
tration agreements by an order compelling arbitration; (2) indirect en-
forcement by an order staying any action brought in violation of an
arbitration agreement; (3) collateral enforcement by an order appoint-
ing arbitrators empowered to proceed with arbitration. As a result of
these enforcement provisions there need never be an "arbitration by
default," or an ex parte hearing. The parties are free to stipulate any
method they wish for selecting the arbitrator. There is no provision that
the arbitrator must be sworn, and no mention is made of the arbitrator's
oath at all. In the absence of any provision requiring the oath, the parties
may be represented by "partial" arbitrators on arbitration boards, as so
many of them apparently wish to be. Furthermore, the arbitrator is given
the power to decide all questions of law and fact necessary to the settle-
ment of the dispute. Indeed, any other provision would be completely
impractical.'" If the arbitrator must refer questions of law to a court,
or if a court is free to review his findings of fact and conclusions of law,
arbitration will be deprived of many of its advantages. At any rate, in
those jurisdictions where the arbitrators enjoy such power, the courts
have not objected to its exercise." 6
There is only one stipulation made in the federal statute regarding
enforcement of awards. If the parties have agreed that the award shall
be made a judgment of a specified court, a party may apply to that court
X"4 Brampton Woollen Co. v. Local Union i2, 61 A. 2d 796 (N.H., r948); Matter of Int'l
Ass'n of Machinists, [etc.] v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E. 2d 464 (1947).
1S The Illinois labor arbitration statute provides that the arbitrator must submit all ques-
tions of law to a court. The statute is not used, for this and other reasons. Notes 54 and 56
supra.
X16 Compare In the Matter of General Electric Co. (United Electrical, Radio & Machine
Workers of America, CIO) r21 N.Y. L.. 193 (1949); Matter of S. A. Wenger & Co., Inc. v.
Propper Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc., 239 N.Y. 199, 146 N.E. 203 (1924).
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for confirmation of the award at any time within one year. Notice of such
application must be served upon the adverse party. In light of the com-
mon-law doctrine that awards are enforcible if there has been no revo-
cation of the agreement prior to the award, the present stipulation is
apparently sufficient, although prudence might suggest that the binding
validity of the award be made explicit. Adequate precautions against
awards procured by improper means and procedures are included in the
Federal Act,1 ' and provision is made for the modification or correction
of an award,118 thus obviating the necessity of overturning the whole
award where only a minor defect is present. The section which author-
izes an order vacating an award where the arbitrator has improperly
refused to postpone a hearing, has refused to hear pertinent and ma-
terial evidence, or by other misbehavior has prejudiced the rights of any
party, sets forth the only limitation upon the procedures which may be
used. In general, it may be said that the requirement of "due process"
is the only procedural limitation in the statute.
It is not likely that the broadening of the jurisdictional area of the
statute would meet strong opposition from the commercial world. Indeed,
the present jurisdictional requirement has been attacked as awkward
and unduly restrictive." 9 There is no reason why an arbitration agree-
ment in a "contract evidencing a transaction in commerce" should be
enforcible to the exclusion of any or all other types of contracts. It
would be possible, of course, to keep the present jurisdictional require-
ments for commercial contracts, while appending the proposed require-
ment for labor-management contracts if this were desired.
17 The Federal Arbitration Act authorizes the district courts to vacate an award:
"(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
"(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them.
"(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing,
upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the con-
troversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
"(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
"(e) Where an award is vacated and the tifne within which the agreement required the
award to be made has not expired, the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the
arbitrators." 61 Stat. 672 (947), 9 U.S.C.A. § io (Supp. 1948).
118 Under the Federal Arbitration Act an award may be modified by the district courts:
"(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident material
mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the award.
"Cb) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, unless it is
a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matters submitted.
"(c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the con-
troversy.
"The order may modify and correct the award, so as to effect the intent thereof and promote
justice between the parties." 6r Stat. 673 (947), 9 U.S.C.A. § ii (Supp. 1948).
"19 See Teller, A Labor Policy for America 175 (I945).
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There are some disadvantages in achieving a method of enforcement
of arbitration agreements by amending the present Federal Act in this
fashion, although on the whole that statute as it now stands is deficient
more for what it does not say than for what it does say. Perhaps the
provision in the present statute which the parties to an industrial dis-
pute-particularly the unions-would find most objectionable is the
clause empowering the court to appoint an arbitrator where the parties
themselves have made no provision for selecting one. This is the col-
lateral method of enforcement named in the Act. Such a provision runs
counter to prevailing labor-management prejudices concerning arbi-
tration. It is a fundamental departure from the salutary principles of
industrial arbitration to let the court impose arbitrators upon the parties.
A possible solution would be to enforce only those agreements in which
the arbitrator is named or in which a method of choosing the arbitrator
is provided. Another possible solution is that of requiring the parties to
choose from a panel of arbitrators, drawn up by the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service or by the American Arbitration Association.
The difficulty, at best, is not great, since most arbitration agreements in
collective bargaining contracts either name the arbitrator or provide a
procedure whereby one shall be selected.
A more serious matter is the absence of anything in the Federal Act
pertaining to the effect of the arbitration agreement, or of the award
itself, upon the rights of individual union members. Nor is there any
provision dealing with the typp of authority, if any, a union member
must give the union in order that he may be bound by the award, just
as there is no provision enabling the individual member to enforce an
award. Most of these questions have come up and have been answered
in jurisdictions with similar statutes. It has been held in New York that
an employee cannot sue upon a dispute covered by an arbitration clause
in a collective agreement. 20 Under this view the individual employee is
bound by the arbitration clause as well as by the award. 2' The action
the union takes to settle the dispute, pursuant to the collective agree-
ment, binds the employee. A necessary corollary to this view is the rule
allowing the individual employee to enforce the award, usually as a third
party beneficiary.'22 In those states where the view still exists that the
120 Compare Triboro Coach Corp. v. N.Y. State Labor Relations Board, 22 N.Y.S. 2d ioi 3
(194o), aff'd 286 N.Y. 3 r4,36 N.E. 2d 3 r5 (1941), motion for rearg. den. 287 N.Y. 647,39 N.E.
2d 276 (1941); Appeal of Devery, 266 App. Div. 213, 41 N.Y.S. 2d 293 (1943); Di Natale v.
Cavallero, 85 N.Y.S. 2d 424 (1948).
-nSperling v. Newtown Laundry Service, 264 App. Div. 878, 35 N.Y.S. 2d 588 (1942);
Curti v. Union Eng. Corp., 12 B.N.A. Lab. Arb. 292 (N.Y. S. Ct., 1949).
- Curti v. Union Eng. Corp., 12 B.N.A. Lab. Arb. 292 (N.Y. S. Ct., 1949).
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union member is the actual party to the collective contract-and the
union his agent-the union member can enforce the agreement or the
award directly. 23 The individual member is still bound by the arbitra-
tion clause. But there is room for serious doubt as to which way the
federal courts would go in the absence of specific statutory provisions
covering these matters.
While the state courts have had no difficulty about authorization by
the union member to his union concerning the latter's right to represent
him in his grievances and to carry his disputes to arbitration, the federal
courts have been considerably troubled by this problem. It has faced
them in cases involving the construction of the Railway Labor Act, The
Railway Labor Act (the only federal statute specially designed for vol-
untary arbitration) provides that, when a controversy is submitted to
arbitration by the parties to an agreement covered by the Act, the sub-
mission shall be binding upon those parties. 24 The Act also provides,
however, that the individual employee has the right to confer with his
employer concerning his individual working conditions. 25 In the Burley
cases 26 the Supreme Court was confronted with the question of the type
of authorization required before the union can bind the individual em-
ployee in an arbitration settlement under that Act. The union had arbi-
trated a grievance and an award had been handed down. Dissatisfied
with the award, the aggrieved employees brought suit upon the dispute
which involved back wages for alleged "starting time." The Supreme
Court first indicated that specific authorization from the employee to the
union to settle his particular grievance is required. 7 But on a rehearing
123 Compare Mencher v. B. & S. Abeles & Kahn, 274 App. Div. 585, 5o, 84 N.Y.S. 2d 718,
722 (1948) (citing cases); In re I. Miller & Sons v. United Office & Professional Workers, Lo-
cal 16, CIO, 6 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 65048 (1949).
124 8 Stat."97 (1934), 45 U.S.C.A. § 158 (i943).
r~sThis section of the Act reads: "Provided, That nothing in this chapter shall be con-
strued to prohibit a carrier from permitting an employee, individually, or local representatives
of employees from conferring with management during working hours without loss of time.
." 48 Stat. ii86 (1934), 45 U.S.C.A. § 152(4) (1943).
126 Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (z945), on rehearing, 327 U.S. 661 (1946).
X27 Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 7XI (i945). The Court felt that this, together
with the provision set forth in note 125 supra, § 3(1)(j) which provides that "parties may be
heard either in person, by counsel, or by other representatives, as they may respectively elect
... ," was conclusive indication that Congress had not meant to nullify "all preexisting rights
of workers to act in relation to their employment, including perhaps even the fundamental
right to consult with one's employer, except as the collective agent might permit." Ibid.,
at 734.
For a scholarly exposition of the legislative intent in the Railway Labor Act see Weyand,
Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 45 Col. L. Rev. 556, 568 et seq. (1945). This article
advances what is probably the best discussion and defense of the majority-ruleprinciple extant.
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of the case, the Court indicated that such authorization is virtually pre-
sumed. 2 Now the party wishing to overturn the settlement has the
burden of disproving the authorization.
While the Burley cases involved the construction of the Railway
Labor Act only, their influence has been broadened by the inclusion
in the Taft-Hartley Act of that clause of the Railway Labor Act which
saves to the individual employee the right to confer with his employer
concerning his individual working conditions.12 The result of the second
Burley case, while an advance over the view the Court first adopted,
still retains some of what Justice Frankfurter in his dissent in the first
case termed "destructive individualism"' 130 in the area of collective bar-
gaining. It must be readily apparent that such an "independent right"
to ignore arbitration procedures and to litigate disputes strikes at the
very heart of the collective bargaining agreement and at the peaceful
settlement of disputes by arbitration. Here again is evident the anomaly
of requiring labor and management to reach agreements, without regard
as to how those agreements are to be kept.
If the second suggested device for enforcing arbitration agreements
is chosen-that of amending the National Labor Relations Act to make
it an unfair labor practice for an employer or a labor union to fail to
comply with an arbitrator's award or to refuse to do any act necessary
to comply with the arbitration agreement-the same problems con-
fronted in the first suggested method would arise concerning the effect
and finality of the agreement and the award. As the National Labor
Relations Act now stands, it would be next to useless to add a pro-
vision of this type, since employees are at present free under Section
9(a) to settle their own grievances in their own way. But if that part
of the NLRA could be discarded, there would be a great deal to say for
this method of enforcing arbitration agreements and awards. First of all,
it would have the virtue of simplicity. The National Labor Relations
Board, without doubt our most experienced tribunal where labor matters
are concerned, would be the only body empowered to settle disputes
128 Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 327 U.S. 66r (1946). The rehearing was the result of a
petition joined in by the railroads, unions (railroad as well as the national AFL and CIO)
and interested government agencies. The effect of the first decision had been drastic. The ma-
chinery of the Railway Labor Act came to a halt, and railroad managements began to insist
upon written powers of attorney in dealing with unions. An exhaustive analysis of the Burley
decisions and their effect appears in Watt, Organized Labor and the Taft-Hartley Act, 7 Law-
yers Guild Rev. 193, 206 et seq. (1947).
"19 6i Stat. z4o (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § i58(a) (Supp. 1948).
130 Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 7XI, 758 (1945).
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over arbitration agreements and awards coming within the federal juris-
diction, except in situations falling under the Railway Labor Act. Under
such a set-up, a greater degree of uniformity and predictability of de-
cision would result. And since labor arbitration agreements are infre-
quently violated and awards are seldom ignored, it is not likely that such
an additional task would add greatly to the work of the Board.
The disadvantages of putting matters into the hands of the NLRB
stem principally from the practical difficulties that might arise if an
arbitration statute were appended to the NLRA. To make the breach
of an arbitration agreement an unfair labor practice would not alone
solve the task of enforcing the agreement. Provisions for the appoint-
ment of arbitrators, a statement of the permissible grounds for setting
aside or modifying awards and for enforcing awards, and the details of a
method whereby the Board, or either party, could obtain a stay of any
action brought in the courts on the arbitrable dispute, to enumerate
some of the troublesome items, would virtually require that an entire
arbitration statute be included within the NLRA. At the same time,
careful draftsmanship would obviate most of these problems; and the
increased prospects for uniformity, with the resulting greater stability
of labor relations, would seem to counterbalance any of these disadvan-
tages. In addition to that, organized labor would probably be far more
amenable to putting their affairs into the hands of the Board than to
entrusting them to the courts.
Of course, either method would be effective, and the one which most
satisfies both parties should be adopted. Society's interest, on the whole,
is in obtaining the peaceful settlement of industrial disputes. This inter-
est is best served when the conditions attending the settlement of these
disputes are satisfactory to both parties. The only limits to the creation
of these satisfactory conditions are those beyond which general social
interests will be adversely affected. The device of arbitration as a means
of settling industrial disputes remains safely within these boundaries.
Indeed, the real interests of society demand a greater general use of the
arbitral process. As everyone now knows, the repercussions of strikes
spread far beyond the immediate area of conflict; and their recurrence
is capable of disrupting the whole social and economic fabric. If society
is to find a cure-or at least a palliative-for these spastic disturbances,
some method of settling industrial disputes must be found. Arbitration
is the method that has been widely selected by the disputants them-
selves. And the only social interest that arbitration has ever been
accused of having transgressed is that of the judiciary against being
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"ousted of its jurisdiction." Such an alleged "interest" can no longer
be taken seriously. Indeed, if real social interest were the sole consider-
ation, purely aside from the interests of the immediate industrial dis-
putants themselves, arbitration should be compulsory. Certainly the fact
remains that other nations have reached this result. 3 '
In this country, however, such a step is now politically impossible.
Even if compulsory arbitration were generally imposed by legislation,
the existing structure of labor relations as we now know it would crumble
away. For our present social structure is not geared to absorb the fric-
tions that would be generated by depriving labor and management of
their recourse to economic self-help. Indeed, it is unlikely that such a
step could be taken at all, unless drastic changes were made in our basic
political system; and such changes are fortunately not likely to be made
within the foreseeable future.
Meanwhile, the future of industrial peace lies in encouraging the dis-
putants to arbitrate voluntarily. Surely it would not be going too far to
require that arbitration be made the terminal point of every contract
grievance procedure.' 32 For if general social interests are balanced
against the individual interests involved in everyday grievances arising
under collective agreements, it is safe to say that the possible danger to
society resulting from the uncontrolled prosecution of such disputes is
far beyond the benefit thereby gained by any individual. But perhaps
we have not yet reached this stage of development. Arbitration, in spite
of its war-given impetus, is still fairly novel in many industrial areas.
We have as yet few competent arbitrators; and the specially-trained
arbitrator is a rare individual indeed. Moreover, such a compulsive
measure might actually result in expanding the areas of recourse to
self-help, since the parties by contract might exclude certain disputes
from their grievance procedures. Perhaps for a start it will be sufficient
to expect organized labor and management to recognize their voluntary
commitments to arbitrate and to ask organized society, through its laws,
to support and encourage them to this end.
13' Australia and New Zealand are leading examples. See Williams, The Compulsory Settle-
ment of Contract Negotiation Labor Disputes, 27 Tex. L. Rev. 587 (I949), for a discussion of
the development of this method of settlement both here and abroad.
' In effect this is the result reached by the Railway Labor Act. Under the Act either party
may force the other to submit his grievance to arbitration. This stipulation was added by the
1934 amendment to the Act. As the Supreme Court has said, "The aim [of the amendment]
was not to dispense with agreement. It was to add decision where agreement fails and thus to
safeguard the public as well as private interests. . . ." ElginJ. & E. Ry.Co. v. Burley,325 U.S.
711, 728 (i945).
